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Introduction
Post-independence development discourse in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) has been about the challenges 
of translating the vast potential of the country into 
improved standards of living for all Papua New 
Guineans. This quest is reflected in the work of the 
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) prior to 
independence in 1975. The CPC’s recommendations 
fed into the National Goals and Directive Principles 
(NGDPs) in the preamble to the constitution. The 
NGDPs are mostly aspirational. They will have 
practical relevance to the citizenry if they are used 
to guide policy planning and applied in decision-
making processes. The five NGDPs are: integral human 
development; equality and participation; national 
sovereignty and self-reliance; natural resources and 
environment; and Papua New Guinean ways (see 
Annexure 1). 
However, the consultative CPC efforts were not 
done in isolation from the range of opinions and ideas 
generated in the context of that period. PNG’s post-
independence development prospects allowed for a 
rigorous input of views from officials in the Australian 
administration, multilateral organisations, academic 
think tanks, expatriate planters, Indigenous Papua 
New Guinean thinkers and a range of personalities, 
providing the conceptual framework for how the 
development priorities of the country were envisaged.  
In 2009 and 2010, two national development 
blueprints were introduced into PNG’s development 
discourse: Papua New Guinea Vision 2050 (Vision 
2050) was launched in 2009 and the Papua New Guinea 
Development Strategic Plan 2010–2030 (PNGDSP) 
officially introduced in 2010. According to the National 
Strategic Plan Taskforce — the framers of Vision 2050 
Executive Summary
In the absence of any coherent framework guiding the 
implementation of the National Goals and Directive 
Principles (NGDPs) in the preamble of Papua New 
Guinea’s (PNG) constitution, their interpretation is 
left to PNG’s public officials. These officials will not 
always agree on the intentions of the NGDPs. When 
left open to various interpretations, the NGDPs can be 
used to promote development strategies substantively 
antithetical to those very national goals. This case 
study of PNG Vision 2050 and the Papua New Guinea 
Development Strategic Plan 2010–2030 (PNGDSP) 
will illustrate this point. These plans promote rapid 
economic growth as the means to achieve development 
in PNG. Their versions of development are staked on 
a range of policy options: trade liberalisation, land 
reforms and the redistribution of petroleum-related 
wealth channelled through economic corridors. 
This paper will illuminate the disconnect between 
PNG’s public policy thinking and the NGDPs. When 
the National Strategy for Responsible Sustainable 
Development (StaRS) was developed in 2013, it was 
critical of some core assumptions of Vision 2050 and 
the PNGDSP. StaRS seems to suggest that there is no 
consensus on what the NGDPs mean to policymakers 
in PNG today, hence the competing narratives of these 
three development blueprints. This paper revisits the 
development models promoted in recent national plans, 
the influences that framed their ambitious visions and 
their compatibility with the earlier NGDPs. Learning 
from the failed attempts at implementing the NGDPs, 
this paper suggests making them justiciable and 
institutionalised — as suggested by the Constitutional 
Planning Committee (CPC) —for the purpose of 
vetting development policies and programs.
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and the earlier NGDPs ensues. Through development 
blueprints such as Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP, policy 
planners seek the legitimising authority of the NGDPs. 
As will be argued in this section, Vision 2050 and the 
PNGDSP, much like any future blueprint, should be 
subjected to rigorous testing of their alignment to the 
NGDPs. Such exercises give credibility to national 
aspirations and reinforce their practical application 
in national development. The third part of this paper 
addresses the specific manner in which both Vision 
2050 and the PNGDSP deviate from the framework set 
out by the CPC. Though Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP 
both came about during the tenure of the National 
Alliance-led government of Sir Michael Somare in 
the period 2009 to 2010, there are critical points of 
departure between the two documents. Somare was also 
chief minister (during self-government) when the CPC 
was doing its work, including drafting the NGDPs. 
Since their conception, these two policy documents 
have been more rhetorical than substantive. With 
the failure of PNG to attain any of the Millennium 
Development Goals in 2015, and the much-talked-
about infusion of LNG revenues into the economy 
from that multi-billion kina project, now is the time to 
examine the role of both Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP 
in the development process. 
The fourth and final part of this paper highlights 
possible areas to begin a serious rethinking of 
development planning. The introduction of the 
National Strategy for Responsible Sustainable 
Development (StaRS) by the Department of 
National Planning and Monitoring for PNG offers 
the opportunity to reconsider some ideas around 
sustainable development and policy planning without 
dependence on extractive sector projections in 
development outcomes. The major takeaway message 
of this paper is the relevance of the NGDPs in national 
discussions and the critical roles that policymakers 
ought to play in enhancing the practical value of the 
NGDPs. As Ben Scott observed:
A new series of consultations would allow the 
population to return to fundamental questions 
about their political system with the benefit of 
greater education and 30 years’ experience of 
what works and what does not’ (2005:65). 
A national conversation on the relevance of the NGDPs 
should be part of this process.
— Vision 2050 will guide PNG to build a ‘smart, fair, 
wise, healthy and happy nation’ (GoPNG 2010:xv). It 
anticipates that by the year 2050, PNG should bring 
its developmental indicators, notably the United 
Nations Human Development Index, well into the 
top 50 of the defined ranking, the category of a 
middle-income country. 
The PNGDSP followed Vision 2050 and sought 
to ‘translate the focus areas of PNG Vision 2050 into 
concise directions for socio-economic development, 
spelling out sector interventions with clear objectives, 
quantitative targets, and baseline indicators’ (GoPNG 
2014:16). Under the PNGDSP, PNG aspires to be 
‘a prosperous, middle-income country by 2030’ 
(Department of National Planning and Monitoring 
2010:4). Unlike Vision 2050, the PNGDSP seeks to 
achieve this goal within a 20-year period. There is a 
curious lack of consensus about the time differentials 
in these two documents. How the intended end point 
of development is determined by PNG policymakers 
demonstrates the contradictory narratives at play. If the 
PNG writers of these policy blueprints have different 
timeframes to attain their visions for the country, how 
incongruous are their interpretations of the NGDPs — 
the national ideals they both cite as starting points? In 
addition to their differing timeframes, the PNGDSP is 
far more detailed in its implementation agenda. One of 
the policy interventions in Vision 2050 — the concept 
of economic corridors — is given prominence and 
expanded upon in the PNGDSP. Economic corridors 
are envisaged as distributional hubs in impoverished 
regions of the country which will be integrated into the 
mainstream economy through targeted investments.
This paper is organised into four parts. The first 
explores the background of the NGDPs in the pre-
independence period and the reason for their enduring 
importance. It covers the CPC’s terms of reference 
and intentions and identifies core elements of the 
Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee. 
Also discussed is the Overseas Development Group’s 
A Report on Development Strategies for Papua New 
Guinea (1973), from which the NGDPs distilled a 
range of policy recommendations. This report, usually 
referred to as the ‘Faber Report’ was the basis for what 
became the ‘eight aims’, which in large part framed the 
discussions that went into the NGDPs. 
The second part of this paper challenges common 
assumptions about Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP. A 
discussion on the relationship between these plans 
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permanently asserts the presence of the NGDPs for 
purposes of governing in PNG. Though it is argued that 
the NGDPs are non-justiciable, the acknowledgement 
of the NGDPs in the PNG constitution gives credibility 
to their existence as an encompassing and timeless 
point of reference in development planning in PNG. 
Legislating to implement what are essentially a set 
of ideals is a perennial problem in PNG. For example, 
the failure of the political engineering of political 
parties and voter systems in PNG attests to the inability 
of legislation to induce appropriate political behaviour 
(see Baker 2005; Reilly 2002). Attempts must be 
exhausted to enable the NGDPs to be a ‘philosophy of 
life’ in PNG, as intended by the CPC (Constitutional 
Planning Committee 1974:2/1). Revisiting the 
recommendations of the CPC is insightful in this 
instance, especially their call for the NGDPs to 
be mainstreamed in every facet of PNG’s political 
socialisation institutions. 
Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC) terms of reference
In August 1974, PNG’s CPC completed one of the most 
comprehensive exercises in nationwide consultations. 
It had specific terms of references (TORs) to undertake 
the process of consultations. It was also given unlimited 
powers beyond the TORs to consult widely. The TORs 
for the consultative process had been announced 
by then-chief minister Michael Somare two years 
earlier on 23 June 1972. The CPC was to set PNG’s 
post-independence priorities. The committee’s report 
covered an array of themes ranging from the system 
of government to the rights of citizens, the powers of 
constitutional offices, external relations and so forth. 
The NGDPs and the eight aims
But perhaps the most profound insight in the visionary 
thinking of the CPC was the inclusion of the NGDPs 
in chapter two of the 1974 Constitutional Planning 
Committee Report. Reflective of the challenge of 
creating a post-colonial society where common 
national narratives were drawn from amongst the 
diverse cultures and peoples who would make up the 
nascent PNG nation-state, the NGDPs were to serve 
as a benchmark to guide decision-making and the 
national discourses and practices of PNG. 
The eight aims, distilled from the Faber Report, 
informed the subsequent development of the NGDPs.
They called for: 
(1) a rapid increase in the proportion of the economy 
under the control of Papua New Guinean 
This paper calls upon Papua New Guineans to agree 
to a coherent application of the principles contained 
in the NGDPs and, more importantly, implement the 
recommendations of the CPC. A body is needed to 
vet national development initiatives according to set 
standards in furthering the NGDPs. Additionally, the 
political socialisation processes at the heart of the CPC 
recommendations are fundamental to acquainting 
younger generations of Papua New Guineans with 
the NGDPs. Contrary to Conroy’s characterisation 
of the NGDPs as ‘a dead letter’ (2015:2), the NGDPs 
are superior to other development goals. Because of 
their constitutional status, the NGDPs are legitimately 
aspired to standards in guiding planning exercises and 
a yardstick ‘against which governments [performance] 
are still measured’ (Denoon 2012:124). The NGDPs, 
even with the challenges present at the time of their 
creation, are identified as the outcome of a legitimate 
process of popular consultation undertaken by the CPC 
(see Ritchie 2003). The NGDPs need to be given their 
rightful place in the development thinking of PNG 
through specific guidelines for implementing their 
constitutive principles in national policy development.
Part I: PNG’s Pre-Independence Development Debate
The NGDPs in the PNG constitution’s preamble serve 
as a guiding framework for development planning. 
Instrumentalities of government have a duty to 
encourage compliance with the NGDPs. The PNG 
Law Reform Commission (PNGLRC), reflective of the 
ambivalent mood of the post-independence failure 
to implement the NGDPs, defined the characteristics 
of the NGDPs as: ‘The National Goals and Directive 
Principles are legal norms, of a non-justiciable nature, 
cast at a higher level of abstraction than is normally 
found in statute law’ (1990:5). The PNGLRC further 
added that: ‘What is missing is a middle-level or 
intermediate group of legal norms that would enable 
the values of the National Goals and Directive 
Principles to be transmitted into statutory form’ 
(ibid.). But is it necessary for the creation of enabling 
legislations to compel implementation of the NGDPs?
There are sufficient recommendations and 
provisions in the CPC report and the constitution ‘to 
apply and give effect to’ the NGDPs (see Sch.1.7 of the 
constitution of PNG). For instance, sections 25 and 63 
of the PNG constitution acknowledge the NGDPs as 
visions that should guide development thinking and 
decision-making processes in PNG. The constitution 
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individuals and groups as well as the proportion of 
personal and property income that goes to Papua 
New Guineans; 
(2) more equal distribution of economic benefits, 
including movements towards equalisation of 
income among people and towards equalisation of 
services among different areas of the country; 
(3) the decentralisation of economic activity, planning 
and government spending, with emphasis on 
agricultural development, village industry, better 
internal trade and more spending channelled to local 
and area bodies; 
(4) an emphasis on small-scale artisan, service and 
business activity, relying where possible on typically 
Papua New Guinean forms of activity; 
(5) a more self-reliant economy, less dependent on 
imported goods and services and better able to meet 
the needs of its people through local production; 
(6) an increasing capacity to meet government spending 
needs from locally raised revenue;
 (7) a rapid increase in the equal and active participation 
of women in all forms of economic and social activity;
 (8) government control and involvement in those 
sectors of the economy where control is necessary to 
achieve the desired kind of development. 
The work of the CPC, the origins of the NGDPs 
and the development model of the CPC have been 
subjects of scholarly re-examination in the recent 
decade (see Kari 2005; Narokobi 2016; Ritchie 2003). 
Autobiographical accounts by some members of the 
CPC reveal the initial agreements on the likely content 
of the constitution and the NGDPs. Much of the debate 
centred on its likely constitutional status and whether 
it was truly reflective of the collective identity of Papua 
New Guineans and an instrument of national ideology. 
In most instances, the discussions about development 
went into the framing of the NGDPs. Therefore, it is 
incorrect to suppose that the newly independent PNG 
government had a unified approach to development 
policy and planning in the 1970s. This explains the 
divergent interpretations of the NGDPs in the current 
context of policy blueprints. But the formalisation of the 
NGDPs through their addition to the preamble to the 
PNG constitution indicates their superior status in the 
guiding of national development and, more importantly, 
the outcome of serious consensus-building in the 
process of creating the NGDPs. 
What came out of this nationwide consultation 
process was a report containing detailed 
recommendations for the Constitution of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea (Constitutional 
Planning Committee 1974). The CPC included the 
NGDPs in chapter two of their report and these were 
later included in the preamble to the constitution. It was 
envisaged that constitutional bodies should work within 
the framework of the NGDPs ‘to apply and give effect 
to’ the NGDPs (see Sch.1.7 of the constitution of PNG). 
The NGDPs acquired a Papua New Guinean character, 
resonating with a political elite who maneuvered the 
transition to nationhood. 
The CPC envisaged the creation of a ‘Permanent 
Committee to review laws and policies for compliance 
with the Human Rights and Obligations and 
National Goals and Directive Principles set out in the 
Constitution’ (Constitutional Planning Committee 
1974:5/1/20). Since independence, the indecisiveness 
to give effect to this CPC proposal is one obvious 
reason for the lack of substantive implementation of 
the NGDPs. How the NGDPs are interpreted has 
been more or less at the whim of political leaders and 
public policy officials. 
Intentions and ideals of the CPC
In the final report of the CPC, an enduring question 
is posed: What kind of society do we want? The 
CPC framed the NGDPs with this question in mind. 
Provisions were also included to periodically undertake 
a stock-take of the actualisation of the NGDPs (see 
General Constitutional Commission 1983:19–20). 
There are crucial points in the intentions of the CPC 
that are relevant to contemporary planning efforts. The 
critical question is whether, left to their own devices, 
policymakers are guided by the intentions and values of 
the NGDPs in decision-making situations.
Firstly, the CPC’s report urges Papua New Guineans 
to use their own initiatives in development, but with the 
NGDPs as their constant point of reference. Secondly, 
the presence of the NGDPs in the preamble to the 
PNG constitution signifies their permanent character 
and allows them to permeate the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
institutions of state and the citizenry, ensuring that they 
become ‘the philosophy of life by which we want to live 
and the social and economic goals we want to achieve’ 
(Constitutional Planning Committee 1974:2/1). Though 
the NGDPs framework was established to guide Papua 
New Guinean thinking on development, it does not 
prescribe specific strategies to guide implementation. 
Much of that initiative was left to decision-makers 
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the distillation of a range of experiences with ideas 
and programs. 
Ideals drawn from the aspirations of some members 
of the CPC emphasised a Papua New Guinean-oriented 
conception of development thinking, inspired in 
part by the decolonisation narrative of other post-
colonial states around the world. In the final report 
of the CPC, there is an emphasis on ‘obligations to 
our community’, noting how ‘[m]ost of our societies 
are classless and egalitarian’ (Constitutional Planning 
Committee 1974:18). References to egalitarianism and 
the village as the sub-unit of the nation were idealised 
by CPC members such as John Momis (1975) and 
Bernard Narokobi (1983). And yet, whilst members of 
the CPC were adamant about egalitarianism and the 
need for the inclusion of rural communities in national 
development, the reality was that the emergent urban-
based political leadership of PNG were themselves 
aspiring commercial and business persons. 
Predating the work of the CPC, the Faber 
Report cautioned that the Indigenous politicians 
and bureaucrats were poised to control the state 
machinery. The Faber Report’s observation was made 
in the context of the evolution of an Australian policy 
transition from uniform development to accelerated 
development. What emerged was an Indigenous 
capitalist bloc — ‘Indigenous bourgeois and would-be 
bourgeois’ — seeking ‘to press claims for preferential 
treatment’ in post-independence PNG (MacWilliam 
2013:211). The decentralisation of government 
power was proposed as necessary to counteract this 
potentially uneven distribution of power, but was also 
premised on the diffusion of development outward 
into non-urban areas of the country. Such was the logic 
of decentralisation, predating even the present idea of 
economic corridors: ‘growth points in less developed 
areas’ (ODG 1973:92).
The Faber Report, and later the CPC report, sought 
to define development as a holistic and inclusive 
process. Predating the CPC report, the Faber Report 
recognised that economic growth is not exclusively 
the end of development, but rather an equitable 
process of opportunity enhancing the pathway to 
participation through the localisation of Papua New 
Guinean efforts and initiatives (ODG 1973:11). Given 
the influence of the Faber Report in pre-independence 
development discourse, it is not surprising that the 
NGDPs emphasise ‘the value of human rights and 
dignity, democracy and participation, egalitarianism, 
to make sense of in their respective positions in the 
community and in public service. Understandably, 
Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP sought to deal with 
this void and clearly articulate specific strategies for 
individual development sectors in PNG. The question 
is whether decision-makers are guided by the NGDPs, 
or are even knowledgeable of the NGDPs to assess 
national development priorities (Kari 2005). Invariably, 
the track record in the misapplication of the NGDPs 
demonstrates that they are not.  
The World Bank report
Two additional important reports framed deliberations 
about the PNG post-colonial economic model. 
Firstly, The Economic Development of the Territory 
of Papua and New Guinea report by the World 
Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development appears to have guided the efforts of 
the Australian colonial administration to encourage 
large-scale foreign investment in primary industry. 
This state-led development discourse traces its 
origins to a report by the first World Bank mission 
(WB/IBRD 1965). The concern with smallholder 
agriculture was consistent with the bank’s framework 
in countries decolonising and gaining independence 
during the 1960s and early 1970s. Investing in the 
expatriate-managed agriculture sector would serve as 
the economic foundation for political independence 
(ibid.). Mining and large-holding agriculture were 
to be the means by which governments with limited 
revenues would gain the resources needed to promote 
smallholder agriculture.
The Faber Report
The second report was by the Overseas 
Development Group — the Faber Report (1973). 
The recommendations in the Faber Report were later 
distilled and formed the key points of the eight aims. 
For instance, the Faber Report espoused ‘increased 
local, indigenous control of the economy, and 
indigenisation of many forms of economic activity’ 
and the exhortation to curtail dependence on ‘foreign 
grants-in-aid and, ultimately, upon foreign investment 
capital’. Sam Sirox Kari (2005:12) suggests that the 
origins of the eight aims even predated the work of 
the CPC, beginning with official policy positions 
of the Australian administrations (1965–71). This 
demonstrates that the origins of the NGDPs are the 
result of a consensus-formation processes and were 
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self-reliance and autonomy’ (Ghai and Regan 1992:6) 
over economic growth. However, this level of idealism 
is open-ended. At the heart of understanding how 
subsequent national development strategies should be 
framed is the practicality of their implementation.  
The Constitutional Planning Committee report
The CPC report recognised the need for an Indigenous 
entrepreneurial sector. The Faber Report supported 
the view that state action was necessary in supporting 
local entrepreneurship. This view was embraced by 
the CPC, which advocated for creating room for 
Indigenous capitalism through state action. The CPC 
recognised the direct correlation between Papua New 
Guinean control over their economic affairs and the 
preservation of PNG’s sovereignty. It urged caution 
in dealing with foreign investment (Constitutional 
Planning Committee 1974:1/16–19) and recommended 
strict measures be applied in safeguarding local 
ownership of economic enterprise. According to the 
CPC, PNG’s global economic competitiveness should 
be reflective of the domestic strength of its Indigenous 
entrepreneurial capacity. 
The CPC envisaged local ownership of economic 
activities and a thriving domestic market as a realistic 
indication of economic sovereignty (Constitutional 
Planning Committee 1974:2/8). It recognised that 
local ownership and control of the economy enhance 
self-reliance, economic sovereignty and economic 
empowerment. This pursuit of self-reliance expressed 
by the CPC did not simply spontaneously enter the 
national discourse. It was with this ideal in mind 
that the National Investment and Development 
Authority was established in 1974 with the intention 
of regulating foreign investment and promoting 
Indigenous participation in economic ventures. The 
post-independence development of PNG was premised 
on the assumption that a strong state would play the 
role of regulator to foreign capital and investment, be 
an investor in its own right and promote Indigenous 
ownership of the national economy.
Land and mining
 Two further areas need elaboration here. The first 
is the holistic appreciation of land in a traditional 
PNG society. The second is the impact of mining 
and extractive sectors on the economy. In the CPC 
report, the control of customary land is seen not only 
as a source of sustenance, but also as intrinsic to the 
social and cultural identity of Papua New Guineans. 
For the most part, this was also the prevailing view 
of the Australian colonial administration in the pre-
independence period — that Papua New Guineans’ 
attachment to the land should be protected (MacWilliam 
2013). Then-territories minister Paul Hasluck tried 
to ensure Indigenous control over land resources, 
supported by academic research by the Australian 
National University’s Research School of Pacific 
Studies. It was in this context of the official discourse 
on the ideal development of PNG society that the CPC 
concluded that ‘since we [Papua New Guineans] are a 
rural people, our strength should be essentially the land 
and the use of our innate artistic talents’ (Constitutional 
Planning Committee 1974:2/15). The CPC merely 
reinforced the belief that land, notwithstanding its 
economic potential, should continue to provide a 
safety net for the vast majority of Papua New Guineans 
(Constitutional Planning Committee 1974:2/6) and 
must be protected to ensure the continuity of the socio-
cultural identities of Papua New Guineans. 
PNG’s predominantly agrarian society (as PNG 
relies on communal control of land) has prevented ‘the 
emergence of a class of landless people as has occurred 
in so many other developing countries’ (Constitutional 
Planning Committee 1974:2/6–7). The agrarian lifestyle 
of Papua New Guineans, as in other parts of Melanesia, 
has been the basis of communal societies’ social security 
in times of uncertainty in the formal economic sector.
Mining, and the extractive sector of the economy in 
general, also features in the CPC report. Of particular 
concern is its direct effect on PNG’s economic 
sovereignty and the economic empowerment of PNG’s 
citizens. The fourth goal of the NGDPs is explicit: ‘The 
natural resources and the environment of Papua New 
Guinea should be conserved and used for the collective 
benefit of the people and should be replenished in 
the interest of future generations’. Whilst the NGDPs’ 
emphasis was intended to guide sustainable exploitation 
of PNG’s natural resources, the reality is that today PNG 
is considered a ‘mineral-dependent economy’ (Filer 
and Imbun 2009:76) whose fortunes are perilously 
‘vulnerable to fluctuations in the global markets’ 
(Asian Development Bank 2012:iv). PNG’s ‘commodity 
currency’ — the case highlighted by the ‘vulnerability 
of the Papua New Guinea economy to external shocks’ 
(Kauzi and Sampson 2008:43) — entails the PNG 
economy’s attendant preoccupation with diversification 
efforts. One can therefore understand why the 
diversification of the economic base is emphasised in 
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from regulation to investment promotion. The fact 
that Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP exhort the rapid 
and uncritical liberalisation of the PNG economy to 
the global economy directly conflicts ‘with the third 
national goal and directive principle of the constitution, 
which cautions against “dependence on imported 
skills and resources”’ (Chand and Yala 2012:48). Even 
the current Papua New Guinea National Trade Policy 
2017–2032 interprets the NGDPs to mean ‘a broad-
based economic growth that will ensure integral 
human development and the attainment of national 
[economic] sovereignty, among others’ (Department 
of Trade, Commerce and Industry 2017:39). Again, 
it is demonstrably evident that policy documents in 
PNG are left to public officials’ interpretations as to 
how the NGDPs are advanced. PNG’s integration into 
global trade agreements is justified by vaguely ascribing 
loose citations of the NGDPs. In the absence of any 
coherent standards on how the NGDPs are defined in 
policy outcomes, it is simply taken at face value that 
development plans or trade policies are compatible with 
the ideals of the NGDPs.
After 35 years of independence, Vision 2050 and 
the PNGDSP merely reinforce commonplace rhetoric 
of development planning. Some of the development 
agendas promoted in these recent policy documents 
have been in the foreground of development planning 
in PNG since the late 1980s. Presently, the emphasis 
on the liberalisation agenda is perceived as a policy 
choice to advance the development aspirations in the 
CPC report and the preamble to the constitution, and 
is used to promote the development strategies of Vision 
2050 and the PNGDSP. Far from advancing the ideals 
of the CPC and the NGDPs, Vision 2050 and PNGDSP, 
when scrutinised, actually promote strategies directly 
incompatible with them. 
Part II: Vision 2050, PNGDSP and the Foundational 
National Goals And Directive Principles
Two assumptions about Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP
After almost a decade (2009–19) of Vision 2050 and 
the PNGDSP informing policy planning in PNG, 
it is worth assessing their two central assumptions. 
Firstly, the idea that Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP 
are ‘homegrown’ is inaccurate. By tracking the place 
of these two policy documents in PNG’s development 
thinking, it is possible to see the influence of global 
trends, which tend to be at odds with the core values of 
Vision 2050 and PNGDSP. How the diversification 
agenda is undertaken, however, is framed at the 
discretion of public policy officials.
There is another insidious effect of the dependence 
on extractive-related activities, especially in informing 
national development blueprints. The economic 
fortunes of PNG are inextricably tied to and made to 
depend on mining revenues. Vision 2050 and PNGDSP 
reinforce the belief that the windfall gains from the 
mining sector will finance the implementation of their 
programs. Interestingly, there is an overly optimistic 
projection of revenues from the extractive sector by 
PNG policy planners. These revenue projections are 
unrealistically forecasted into supporting development 
plans such as Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP. The risk 
of relying on the mining and petroleum sectors as 
the basis to initiate national development is perhaps 
best illustrated by the lack of economic benefits from 
the PNG LNG project (Flanagan and Fletcher 2018). 
The rhetoric of the windfall gains from the present 
PNG LNG project and the shortfall in anticipated 
government revenue are impacting PNG’s government 
expenditure priorities in other sectors of the economy. 
Windfall revenues from the extractive sector are an 
extremely unreliable indicator on which to frame 
development plans, yet the PNG government is 
ambitiously relying on them. National plans such 
as Vision 2050 and PNGDSP simply reinforce 
unsustainable demands for growth bankrolled by the 
natural resource extraction (see GoPNG 2014:121).
Global trends and PNG’s development planning
In the years after independence, major setbacks to 
the economy became apparent. The 1980s saw a 
decline in agricultural and metal prices, volatile oil 
prices and, most significantly, the 1989 closure of the 
Bougainville copper mine in the face of an armed 
insurgency. Between 1988 and 1992, PNG experienced 
an economic (and political) crisis initiated by the 
Bougainville rebellion. The situation was further 
exacerbated by the withdrawal of direct budget support 
from the Australian government. One of the government 
responses to this crisis was an appeal for assistance from 
the World Bank, which was provided in the form of three 
adjustment loans (1990, 1995 and 2000). 
The conditions attached to these tranches of loans 
involved efforts to privatise state assets or functions, 
deregulate the national economy, remove trade 
barriers and more. A gradual move was underway 
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of the development strategies blatantly contradict the 
intentions of the NGDPs. Rather than furthering the 
NGDPs, the complete opposite outcome ensues.  
Hence, there is nothing radically novel about Vision 
2050 and the PNGDSP. The development programs 
in these documents are no different from programs 
already making the rounds under the auspices of 
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the 
World Trade Organization. For instance, the PNGDSP 
envisages that economic growth will be ‘undertaken 
through facilitating competition, enhancing the 
operation of markets, improving the effectiveness of 
government services relied upon by the private sector 
and removing impediments’ (Department of National 
Planning and Monitoring 2010:30). These all-too-
familiar prescriptions are the modes of domestication 
from the economic policies of the multilateral bodies 
PNG is party to. 
Development plans and neoliberalism
Domestic competitiveness and the unfettered 
operationalisation of the markets are the overall 
objectives of neoliberal policy prescriptions. The 
assumption is that openness to trade is a key 
determinant of positive economic growth (see Wacziarg 
2002). In this context, neither Vision 2050 nor the 
PNGDSP are motivated by the genuine intention of 
furthering the goals of the NGDPs and PNG’s national 
interests. Rather, both documents pre-empt the 
positioning of PNG to capture whatever benefits from 
greater global economic integration. 
What is evident from the development strategies 
of Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP is the shrinking of 
what Kevin P. Gallagher (2008) refers to as a country’s 
‘policy space’. A policy space is ‘the flexibility under 
trade rules that provides nation states with adequate 
room to manoeuvre to deploy effective policies to 
spur economic development’ (Gallagher 2008:63). 
PNG’s integration into the global economy may be 
with the intention to attract investments and capital. 
But if this is the only motivation in the framing of 
national development blueprints, it overlooks domestic 
guidelines for policy thinking — in PNG’s case, the 
pre-existing NGDPs. 
The relationship between Vision 2050/the PNGDSP and 
the NGDPs
For all the grandiose claims of conformity to the 
NGDPs, no attempt has been undertaken to cross-
examine the very nature of the relationship between 
the NGDPs.
Since at least the 1990s, the creation of a globally 
competitive PNG economy and the liberalisation of 
the domestic PNG economy have been commonly 
articulated in policy documents. Russell Hangatt’s 
statement that for the ‘first time PNG has taken a long-
term focus on development planning and is the first 
time planning has been fully home grown with donors 
shut out of the formulation of the PNGDSP’ (2011:1) 
requires qualification. The argument that Vision 2050 
and the PNGDSP are homegrown policy documents 
is untenable. Both Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP are 
a culmination of the notion that economic growth 
and improved standards of living are best undertaken 
through enhancing the competitiveness and investor-
friendly appeal of the domestic PNG economy. This 
paper argues that recent development blueprints 
are driven by PNG’s increasing conformity to global 
policy trends, rather than the realistic pursuit of the 
aspirations contained in the NGDPs. The NGDPs 
are merely referenced as an afterthought in policy 
documents for the express purpose of giving the 
documents a veneer of legitimacy. Evidently, any 
document that claims its conformity to the NGDPs in 
the preamble to the constitution passes the flimsiest of 
tests without the need for rigorous scrutiny. 
Secondly, the argument that Vision 2050 and the 
PNGDSP are consistent with PNG’s NGDPs is one 
public officials simply evoke in seeking to legitimise 
policy documents. The writers of Vision 2050 and the 
PNGDSP claim that the documents are complementary 
to the ideas of the Constitutional Planning Committee 
and the NGDPs — but are they?  
It is usually taken at face value that Vision 2050 
and the PNGDSP espouse the same ideals as the 
Constitutional Planning Committee report and the 
NGDPs. For instance, Sam Koim asserts that ‘the 
aims of Vision 2050 do not seem different from the 
National Goals and Directive Principles cherished 
in our Constitution’ (2014:28). By all appearances, 
invoking the NGDPs is a post-independence routine 
in policymaking; a convenient ploy at cloaking 
national development plans with an authoritative 
stamp of approval. At best, the referencing of the 
NGDPs is a careless endeavour without any substantive 
commitment to understanding how the actual 
principles or goals of the NGDPS are enhanced in 
national development blueprints. When a thorough 
reading of the development plans is undertaken, some 
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sector of the economy for national development. 
The StaRS blueprint also implies an almost blatant 
misrepresentation of the fundamental principles of 
the NGDPs in both Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP. If 
these national development blueprints have different 
ideas about how development is attained, then the 
very process of deciphering the intentions of the 
NGDPs is a free-for-all task for anyone writing national 
development policies. There is no standard or official 
criteria for assessing the compatibility of development 
initiatives and the NGDPs. In that vacuum, the 
NGDPs have become a mere rubber-stamp for national 
development plans, rhetorically applied without any 
consideration of the intended outcome.  
Part III: How Do Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP 
Misrepresent the Intentions of the NGDPs?
Some notable features of both Vision 2050 and the 
PNGDSP are antithetical to the ideals of the CPC and 
the NGDPs. Further, the implementations of Vision 
2050 and the PNGDSP are premised on an effective 
government system. Though Vision 2050 and the 
PNGDSP claim to align themselves to the NGDPs, 
this section argues that the NGDPs are cited in them 
without any thorough conviction or concern for their 
intentions. Moreover, the blatant misrepresentation of 
the NGDPs is a self-defeating exercise in giving these 
national aspirations practical meaning in the lives of 
Papua New Guineans. The fact that the StaRS document 
points this out means that national policy planning is 
not guided by any standard adherence to the NGDPs.
Domestic development and global competitiveness 
Firstly, the language of Vision 2050 promotes an 
unrestrained, open-ended liberalisation of the economy 
of PNG. In explicit terms, Vision 2050 states: ‘[T]aking 
into account the emerging global economic trends, 
Vision 2050 seeks to position Papua New Guinea 
in the global environment in order to maximise its 
comparative and competitive advantages’ (GoPNG 
2010:2). Vision 2050 is specific when it states that:
Trade liberalisation, preceded by domestic 
structural reforms, will result in lowering the cost 
of doing business and will lead to efficiency and 
higher productivity. Local industries, and the 
manufacturing industry, in particular, have been 
vocal about this. This is a challenge that needs to 
be urgently addressed’ (GoPNG 2010:23).
The Directional and Enabling Statements of Vision 
Vision 2050 or the PNGDSP and the NGDPs. Papua 
New Guineans are naturally accepting of what is deemed 
legitimate when the NGDPs are referenced in official 
policy documents. Vergil Narokobi noticed this anomaly:
Vision 2050 did not consider how the 
Constitution, either in its present state or 
through reforms, could effectively respond to 
developmental challenges using the NGDP and 
BSO [Basic Social Obligations]. Nor did it take 
up the CPC’s proposal to create a permanent 
parliamentary committee to review laws and 
policies to determine their alignment with the 
NGDP and BSO (2016:62). 
In essence, policies and official intentions of 
governments are created with little scrutiny as to 
whether they conform to the expectations of the NGDPs. 
Interestingly, the available literature on Vision 
2050 and the PNGDSP only iterates the preconditions 
needed for the successful implementation of these 
national development strategies. For instance, Tabian 
Ambang assessed the initial the implementation of 
Vision 2050 since its inception in 2009. Ambang argues 
that ‘human development has been largely ignored’ 
(2012:85) in the six years since the introduction of 
Vision 2050, with institutional constraints such as 
infrastructure, law and order, political instability and 
corruption serious problems. Whilst there has been 
interest in creating a supportive environment towards 
the implementation of Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP, 
there has been little coverage of the link between these 
two policy documents and the NGDPs.
Uncovering the relationship between Vision 2050 
and the PNGDSP and the NGDPs should enable 
Papua New Guineans to determine how the aspirations 
enshrined in the constitution are being conveniently 
used as rhetorical justification for development 
planning in PNG. Through a concerted effort to revisit 
the NGDPs and the evolution of policy planning 
experiences in PNG, Papua New Guineans are urged to 
critique the kinds of development agendas promoted 
in national development plans, but more importantly 
revisit the idea of creating the institutional framework 
to implement the NGDPs as recommended by the CPC. 
When StaRS was formulated in 2013, it was 
critical of Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP. StaRS 
demonstrates how incongruous Vision 2050 and the 
PNGDSP are to the idea of sustainable development 
and the unmanageable dependence on the extractive 
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2050 provide key prerequisites for the PNG economy to 
compete globally through ‘tariff reduction’, ‘increased 
trade’ and ‘land reform’ (GoPNG 2010:4).
Opening the PNG market in an attempt to stay 
globally competitive will be beneficial in the short term; 
however, it is at the expense of local development, the 
dignity of PNG citizens and, even more significantly, 
the political sovereignty of the country. Ha-Joon 
Chang cautions that even though foreign direct 
investment ‘can be a very useful tool for development’, 
its usefulness is dependent not only on ‘how the host 
country government regulates it’, but also the kinds of 
investments ‘made in the host country’ (2007:85–86). 
Chang’s warning is particularly relevant. When the 
CPC first addressed the subject of foreign investment, 
they specifically recommended ‘very strict controls’ 
and that foreign investment be considered in light 
of the long-term development it would provide for 
the workforce and skill sets of Papua New Guineans 
(Constitutional Planning Committee 1974:2/9). 
In the assessment of the CPC, the local economic 
base that was intended to take off through the 
insightful integration of planning and decision-
making in the years after independence was perhaps 
a lost opportunity to truly give effect to economic 
independence and political sovereignty. To be fair, the 
CPC did not explicitly propose an export-oriented 
model of economic development, nor did it propose 
that all aspects of development be tailored towards 
meeting the expectations of a global economic system. 
The strength of PNG’s global competitiveness must first 
be seen in its domestic innovation and capacity to first 
and foremost protect the welfare of its citizens. 
StaRS, on the other hand, is critical of unceasing 
dependence on capital-driven economic development. 
Further, StaRS concedes that previous policies:
have been more concerned with improving 
the rate of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
led and financed growth in ways which helped 
government revenue but had further exacerbated 
the dependency and rent seeking culture as well 
as disempowered people from meaningfully 
participating in commerce and business and 
economic development (GoPNG 2014:27). 
‘Economic corridors’ and the disempowerment of sub-
national levels of government
Whilst Vision 2050 promotes an outward orientation 
in economic relations, the PNGDSP is even more 
disempowering. In its justifications for the redistribution 
of development, the PNGDSP proposes the use of 
‘economic corridors’, to which a whole chapter (Part 
2) of the PNGDSP is devoted. Economic corridors are 
considered the ‘main vehicle through which the PNGDSP 
will be implemented to improve the standard of living for 
the disadvantaged in rural areas of PNG’ (Hangatt 2011). 
The proposal for the creation of economic corridors 
must be assessed in relation to the pre-existing sub-
national systems of government. The second NGDP 
states: ‘We declare our second goal to be for all citizens 
to have an equal opportunity to participate in, and 
benefit from, the development of our country’. In 
principle, the current decentralised system of government 
under the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and 
Local Level Governments 1995 (hereinafter the Organic 
Law) provides avenues for citizens to have a direct say in 
the affairs of their communities. 
In addition, the Organic Law provides the structure 
of the local level government, comprising assemblies 
made up of elected ward members, ward development 
committees and village planning committees. These 
are avenues through which citizens participate directly 
in influencing decisions at the sub-national levels of 
government, or in framing development initiatives in 
their communities. Moreover, the mobilisation of local 
capital, and hence, self-reliance is fostered through 
direct ownership of decision-making at the local 
levels of government. 
The PNGDSP’s proposal of the creation of Economic 
Corridor Implementation Authorities (ECIAs) is an 
indication of policy planners’ distrust of sub-national 
levels of government established under the Organic 
Law. This proposal to create additional institutions in 
direct competition with sub-national governments is not 
unique to the PNGDSP. Against the backdrop of failed 
distributional capacities by the national government, 
resorting to institutional remedies is seen as a quick fix 
to developmental challenges in PNG (see, for instance, 
Axline 1993). But while the ECIAs are envisaged as 
mechanisms to instigate economic growth centres, 
such entities will further diminish the legitimacy of 
these constitutionally prescribed tiers of sub-national 
government. Local level governments already face severe 
capacity-related deficiencies. Successive failures by the 
national government in investing in the technical and 
administrative capacities of the provincial and local level 
governments has allowed for the deterioration of their 
leading development initiatives (see GoPNG 1982). 
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the PNG government has adopted the idea that its 
meeting these developmental priorities has to be 
assessed in relation to international benchmarks. The 
issue of whether domestic capacities and alternatives 
exist in framing development is somehow lost in this 
linear notion of development.  
The PNGDSP and Vision 2050 also assume that 
income per capita is the most important measure of 
individual well-being. Higher income levels are equated 
with improved quality of life for PNG citizens. Vision 
2050 and the PNGDSP assume that economic growth 
will be the panacea for the social and economic well-
being of individual citizens. At the macro-level, their 
references to ‘middle-income country’ status guide how 
development is projected and timeframes are used to 
drastically engineer ‘economic growth’. 
Land reform
Land reform is another critical area that needs to be 
assessed for consistency with the spirit of the CPC 
report and the NGDPs. In Vision 2050, four scenarios 
are laid out for the first 10 ten years, from 2010 to 2020, 
that seek to diversify the economic base. These four 
scenarios are: (1) The Base Case; (2) Land Reform; 
(3) Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Project and (4) 
Cumulative Scenario.  
In scenario two, Vision 2050 directs that ‘land 
reform is undertaken starting in 2010’ with the aim of 
freeing up ‘three per cent more of customary land’ into 
the formal sector. More importantly, the assumption 
is that land reform will induce ‘people to participate 
in income-generating activities through cultivation of 
their land’, leading to ‘broad-based economic growth 
and ensure balanced development in rural and urban 
areas’ (GoPNG 2010:26). Thus, ‘decision-makers 
should not relent in their push for land reform, as the 
multiplier effects of such a reform would reverberate 
throughout the country past the life-span of the LNG 
project’ (ibid.). An open-ended proposal is denoted in 
the tone of this relentless program of land reforms.
The anticipated land reforms are projected to 
contribute to a growth in PNG’s real gross domestic 
product (GDP) from ‘K9.7 [in 2010] to K12.5 billion 
[in 2020], which is an increase of K2.8 billion’ (GoPNG 
2010:4). Mass participation in economic ventures by 
citizens is the anticipated outcome of the land reform 
exercise. Land reforms are premised on the:
need to ensure that all land with formal titles, 
either on land owned by customary land-owning 
Recognising choices in the path to development
Another dimension of the disempowering aspects 
of the PNGDSP and Vision 2050 are their use of 
economic growth as an end. When development is 
approached exhaustively from this perspective, it denies 
any creative approach to understanding it on PNG’s 
terms, as proposed by the CPC. Referencing Vanuatu’s 
experiences, Aminio David and Anita Tenkon were 
rightfully critical of the obsession with economic growth 
as the sole indicator of development in Melanesia:
We know how important it is for us to protect our 
land and traditional livelihoods because it is all 
too easy to follow the Western aim of economic 
growth like PNG, where they achieved that end 
but experienced some of the worst development 
standards in the region. Indeed, indicators 
have become worse, yet the aim of economic 
growth using the same failed methods continues 
unquestioned (2015).
These sentiments by the ni-Vanuatu commentators 
make sense when one considers how Indigenous 
and Melanesian world views of well-being are taken 
as alternative indicators (Malvatumauri National 
Council of Chiefs 2012). Vanuatu has ingeniously 
deployed Melanesian-oriented approaches — a critical 
step to negotiating for sustainable development and 
humane dimensions in its development discourse. 
When comparing the alternative models of assessing 
well-being, factors such as access to customary land, 
language vitality and social relationships are privileged 
as starting points in the ni-Vanuatu measure of 
well-being. On the other hand, Vision 2050, though 
extolling the ‘time-tested cultures’ (GoPNG 2010:41) 
of PNG, omits any practical use of PNG’s cultural 
heritage, even in policy planning exercises.
For PNG, Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP align 
development to time-bound and quantifiable targets. 
Ideas about the need for timeframes and set targets 
have evidently influenced development planning. 
The most ambitious attempt on a global scale was 
the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Governments had to commit their countries 
to working towards domesticating and achieving the 
eight MDGs by the year 2015 (within a period of 15 
years from 2000 to 2015). One gets the impression 
here of the manner in which ‘global targets’ effectively 
put governments on notice in fulfilling their domestic 
commitments to global developmental goals. Moreover, 
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social units or by the State was secure enough 
to be utilised as collateral for loans from the 
mainstream financial sector (Yala 2010:2). 
On the other hand, the PNGDSP is markedly more 
ambitious in its land reform agenda. While Vision 
2050 proposes a further three per cent of customary 
land comes into production in the formal sector 
between 2010 to 2020, the PNGDSP sets a 2030 target 
to ‘increase land use within the formal administration 
system to over 20% of PNG’s land mass’ (Department 
of National Planning and Monitoring 2010:43). The 
PNGDSP predicts ‘the introduction of tenure security 
and transparent land markets … will lead to higher 
rates of investment and higher productivity in land 
intensive industries such as agriculture’ (ibid.). The 
PNGDSP estimates that a total of ‘682,000 extra jobs 
will be generated by 2030’ and an ‘additional K18 
billion of GDP’ will be added to the economy as a 
direct result of the land reform exercise (ibid.).
The reality, however, is that the practice of land 
acquisition for agricultural purposes has been fraught 
with serious problems. Colin Filer (2011) provides 
alarming details about the total amount of land now 
in the hands of national and foreign corporate entities, 
illustrating the nexus between foreign and Indigenous 
commercial interests (see also Hambloch 2018). It is 
becoming clear that if political power is misapplied in 
the advancement of the NGDPs, they do not appear 
as guiding principles in the day-to-day operations of 
instrumentalities of the state and political leaders. 
Since 2003, ‘more than 10% of Papua New Guinea’s 
landmass has been handed over to foreign and national 
corporate interests under 99-year Special Agricultural 
and Business Leases (SABL)’ (Pacific Institute of 
Public Policy 2011:2). Whilst Vision 2050 designates 
a timeframe of 10 years for the freeing up of three 
percent of land for development purposes, the SABL 
scheme have seen to it that this goal is already ‘ahead 
of schedule’, with 12 per cent of the country (5.5 
million hectares of land) now in the hands of foreign 
corporations (Mousseau 2013:3). Elaborate schemes for 
boosting an export-based agriculture sector will be at 
the expense of local food security if monocultures are 
the expressed agriculture production choice.
Consider also that the economic modelling used in 
Vision 2050’s projection, labelled flawed by Anderson 
(2013), throws into question the integrity of the 
projected economic growth rate estimated in Vision 
2050’s Scenario Two. It is this same economic modelling 
that was at the centre of the overly optimistic projections 
of the PNG LNG project in 2008 (see Flanagan and 
Fletcher 2018). The track record of this economic 
modelling tool is questionable in the case of the PNG 
LNG project, even though it continues to ‘produce 
very unreliable and upbeat results’ (Flanagan and 
Fletcher 2018:42).
Moreover, the control of land that has persisted 
for generations allows for a diversity of food crops 
and other agricultural commodities to be produced 
towards sustaining PNG’s predominantly rural-based 
communities. While land-based agriculture provides 
nutrition and an abundant choices of food sources, 
arable land is a fast disappearing commodity for the 
subsistence agriculture sector to thrive.
As the experience with SABL demonstrates, land 
alienation compromises economic sovereignty and 
self-reliance in a predominantly agrarian PNG setting. 
Land, including local labour, is the main mode of 
production completely in the hands of Indigenous 
Papua New Guineans. Having access to land is the basis 
on which economic self-reliance and some semblance 
of economic sovereignty are guaranteed. Customary 
control of land and the promotion of subsistence-based 
land use need to be considered for their associated 
non-monetary benefits (Mousseau 2013). A study 
conducted by Tim Anderson (2015) supports the view 
that one need not register land to engage meaningfully 
in the cash economy. The agriculture sector can sustain 
‘hybrid livelihoods’, where the diversification of food 
crops and cash crops can enhance the income-earning 
opportunities of Papua New Guineans. 
Papua New Guineans having access to their 
customary land and using it for their collective benefit 
is an expressive element of the sense of control Papua 
New Guineans have over their options for development. 
However, it is ironic that a program of land reforms 
is not subjected to the NGDPs framework of vetting. 
Unscrupulous behaviours in terms of land grabbing 
were described as a ‘time bomb’ by Sir Leo Dion, a 
former deputy prime minister of PNG (The National 
29 June 2015:7). In land administration alone, there is a 
disconnect between the commitment to the principles 
of national sovereignty and self-reliance and the actual 
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Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP reinforce this logic. 
Any serious efforts by PNG to extricate itself from 
unfulfilled expectations will include limiting the 
pinning of development plans to projected windfalls 
from the extractive sectors. This is not in any way a 
novel proposal (see, for instance, GoPNG 1997). The 
final part of this paper dissects areas of departure from 
the NGDPs in StaRS. The argument then is to see StaRS 
as a convenient starting point in a national conversation 
on alternative models to Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP.
Part IV: The Way Forward
The National Strategy for Responsible Sustainable 
Develompment for PNG (StaRS)
In 2013, the Department of National Planning and 
Monitoring was tasked with revisiting the development 
thinking of Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP. The review 
of Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP was timely, as it 
elevated development priorities that are ‘truly strategic 
in a rapidly changing world’ (GoPNG 2014:17). This 
effort led to the creation of StaRS. 
The introduction of StaRS is considered a catalyst 
for the examination of the ‘very development paradigm 
itself — the underlying values and belief system that 
underpin the model’ (GoPNG 2014:9). As highlighted 
previously, Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP promote 
an unsustainable development paradigm. But simply 
revisiting the idea of development will not suffice. 
Bringing the NGDPs into this discourse is fundamental 
because they are, after all, the enduring guiding 
philosophy for development, hitherto uncritically 
cited in development policies and plans in post-
independence PNG. In natural resource development, 
for instance, the PNG Law Reform Commission 
recommended the building ‘into legislation, wherever 
possible, justiciable guidelines for resource licensing 
and development which take into account the National 
Goals and Directive Principles’ (1990:3). Essentially, the 
idea of translating the NGDPs into specific guidelines is 
not a radical proposition.
StaRS provides a good starting point for the 
national conversation about the intentions of the 
NGDPs because it challenges the model espoused by 
development blueprints like the PNGDSP and Vision 
2050 (GoPNG 2014:21). Under StaRS, the notion 
of inclusive development is embraced. StaRS seeks 
to integrate economic, social and environmental 
challenges into national planning efforts. It is a middle-
The resource sector and the longevity and impact of 
development strategies
Finally, the projected economic growth (demonstrated 
through data) spurred on by the mining and petroleum 
sectors is one factor in the framing of Vision 2050 and 
the PNGDSP. The development of the LNG project is 
at the heart of the elaborate interest in their creation 
as long-term development master plans. Clearly these 
two national policy documents were developed in 
anticipation of ‘capturing and utilising’ the revenues 
from the LNG project. In PNG, mining and petroleum 
traditionally tend to create inflated expectations, and 
it is no coincidence that Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP 
do the same. 
Moreover, it is unlikely that Vision 2050 and 
the PNGDSP are enduring because they are not 
institutionalised in statutory provisions — they are 
simply political expenditure plans or vague visions of 
development envisaged at the whim of political leaders 
and public officials. The record of PNG policy planning 
is replete with examples of the inability of national 
plans to make a difference to the pattern of public 
expenditure. What used to be called the ‘development 
budget’ in the first two decades after independence is 
now largely allocated to national MPs in the way of 
‘slush funds’ — DSIPs (District Services Improvement 
Program funds) and PSIPs (Provincial Services 
Improvement Program funds) — none of whom are 
apparently obliged to justify their spending by reference 
to these planning documents. Vision 2050 and the 
PNGDSP face the same prospects.
The PNGDSP acknowledges that out of the K4.2 
billion in foreign equity investment in 2007, ‘73.6 per 
cent of this foreign equity investment was accounted for 
by the large mineral sector’ (Department of National 
Planning and Monitoring 2010:34), indicating the 
significant role of the mining and petroleum sectors on 
the economy. PNG has adopted an investor-friendly 
regime for its extractive industry and the associated 
dilemmas of being dependent on the extractive 
sector are rife. 
As a consequence of its dependence on mining 
and resource extraction, PNG is still faced with 
‘uneven development and few local linkages between 
the extractive industry and local communities, thus 
rendering PNG politics and economy dominated 
by transnational companies’ (Roche 2015). National 
development plans depend on rent from mining, 
petroleum and foreign aid for their implementation. 
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ground approach between the growth-oriented outlook 
of the PNGDSP and Vision 2050 and the NGDPs. 
The inclusive growth strategy
Firstly, StaRS introduces the notion of inclusive growth 
as a development strategy, which is a process that 
allows for ‘equal access of all on health, education, 
employment and increased social knowledge’ (GoPNG 
2014:37). Inclusive growth is ‘aimed at achieving equity 
between women and men and between rural and urban 
areas’ (ibid.). Vision 2050, and similarly the PNGDSP, 
envisage that economic growth naturally allows for 
increased income-earning opportunities for Papua New 
Guineans, resulting in a higher quality of life (ibid.). In 
contrast, StaRS acknowledges that economic growth 
incurs costs that have irreversible effects on ecology, 
social structures of society and long-term well-being of 
peoples. Economic growth in PNG has historically been 
premised on the performance of the extractive sector.
Where Vision 2050 perceives economic growth 
and its flow-on effects as the measures of development, 
StaRS promotes a development approach that considers 
the natural ecology and social context in which Papua 
New Guineans relate to their natural environment. 
StaRS gives formal recognition to the relationship 
between the development aspirations of Papua New 
Guineans and their possible effects on the natural 
environment. In this, StaRS is consistent with the 
broader agendas of the NGDPs and less consistent with 
the stated outcomes of Vision 2050. According to StaRS:
PNG’s development will follow the path of 
inclusive and innovative green growth which 
helps improve income and employment through 
the creation of innovative green jobs, reduce 
poverty and inequality, improve environmental 
sustainability, and enhances the quality of life of 
the people (GoPNG 2014:34).
With PNG’s experiences of unequal distribution 
of wealth and destructive practices in the extractive 
sectors of the economy, StaRS has identified the 
realities of resource governance. Unaccountable and 
mostly weak public institutions have been implicated 
in both the lack of translation of wealth into overall 
improved standards of living as well as the destruction 
of the natural environment.
The United Nations Development Program 
diagnosed this policy-making paradox: ‘Despite the 
importance given to natural environment in the 
constitution and policy documents such as Vision 2050, 
the institutions of governance for the environment 
are relatively weak’ (2014:65). While multinational 
corporations involved in the extractive industries use 
international best practices in their activities in PNG, 
this is not complemented domestically given the weak 
regulatory framework of the PNG government. The 
NGDPs are treated as a rhetorical attitude rather than as 
guiding principles in decision-making.
PNG economic growth in a global environmental context
Secondly, StaRS acknowledges the global challenges of 
planetary survival, where relentless demands for finite 
resources affect ecological stability and the natural 
environment. In PNG, StaRS claims to be a ‘new 
thinking’ that ‘challenges the view that economic growth 
[be] built on the back of the extraction and export of 
raw natural resources’ (GoPNG 2014: 28). 
StaRS ‘introduces an alternative development 
paradigm and redirects the focus of planning towards 
economic development that is more appropriate and 
responsible in a future that is changing’ (ibid.). Clearly, 
StaRS is a serious attempt to integrate environmental 
concerns and natural resource use into development 
planning. With primary commodity-producing 
economies such as PNG, the sustainability of the natural 
environment is not guaranteed when development 
is pinned to finite non-renewable resources and 
unrestrained growth (GoPNG 2014:21). StaRS makes a 
case for the ‘responsible management and use’ of natural 
resources (GoPNG 2014:16).
StaRS presents an opportunity to not only 
interrogate PNG’s development paradigm but, more 
importantly, generate the political will to bring 
the NGDPs into practical usage in guiding policy 
development thinking. So far, the implementations of 
the PNGDSP and Vision 2050 have been hampered by 
a lack of attention by the government to create enabling 
legislations. In the same vein as Vision 2050, the 
ambitious timeframe earmarked for the implementation 
of the PNGDSP is seriously undermined by the 
absence of its statutory relevance and the political will 
to implement sustainable models of growth (Baloiloi 
2016). Corruption and the misallocation of resources 
in the implementation of national plans must also 
be accounted for. That corruption and the wasteful 
mismanagement of public resources are not treated 
as constraints to development is a disservice to these 
development blueprints. Corruption does not even 
dpa.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 15 
DPA Working Paper 2020/1
2050 and the PNGDSP. The NGDPs are incorrectly 
ascribed as being represented in Vision 2050 and 
the PNGDSP when they have been simply used to 
rubber-stamp them. 
Interpretation of the NGDPs is ultimately placed 
in the hands and wisdom of policymakers, who 
may be well-intentioned, but at liberty to devise and 
interpret the purpose of the NGDPs at their own 
discretion without any consistent scrutiny and vetting. 
Encouraging informed discussion on the NGDPs is 
critical in generating greater awareness of their merits 
(or otherwise) and the possibility of their relevance 
to development thinking.  
The introduction of StaRS is a timely starting point 
to revisit the relevance of the NGDPs in development 
plans today. Whilst StaRS is critical of Vision 2050 
and the PNGDSP, it ultimately demonstrates that there 
is no consensus on how the NGDPs are understood 
by public officials. In the domestic politics of PNG, 
there is also a political dimension to the failure of 
implementing the NGDPs. It creates a legitimacy deficit 
that over the long term compounds lack of confidence 
in those national goals envisaged on the eve of PNG’s 
independence, and prolongs the obscurity of the 
NGDPs in the consciousness of PNG citizens. When 
national programs are couched in the legitimising effect 
of the NGDPs, but are detrimental to the principles 
and goals in the NGDPs, it creates a level of public 
disillusionment about the relevance of the NGDPs.
This paper advocates for a national conversation 
on agreed-upon standards for how the NGDPs are 
understood and their place in the decision-making 
processes of PNG. The CPC proposed the creation of a 
‘Permanent Committee to review laws and policies for 
compliance with the Human Rights and Obligations 
and National Goals and Directive Principles set 
out in the Constitution’ (Constitutional Planning 
Committee 1974:5/1/20). This body could ultimately 
be mandated to review the laws and policies of the 
PNG government to determine their consistency with 
various development plans and policies. The official 
recognition and promotion of the spirit of the NGDPs 
is a practical approach to reminding PNG citizens of 
the relevance of pre-independence aspirations and, 
more importantly, the legitimacy of the constitution as 
a timeless document.
appear as an important planning variable in these 
supposed national development blueprints. The overly 
optimistic plans operate on the assumption that 
public resources will be equitably and efficiently 
allocated in their implementation.  
Trade policy
Finally, striking a balance in PNG’s outward economic 
relations is vital to protecting the economic sovereignty 
and well-being of PNG citizens. In official circles:
Papua New Guinea remains committed to a 
trade policy focused on economically viable 
downstream processing and value added 
production of its natural resources, as well as 
economic diversification to utilise international 
trade for economic growth and development 
(World Trade Organization 2010:11). 
However, in keeping with the CPC’s recommendations, 
‘very strict controls’ (Constitutional Planning Committee 
1974:2/9) are necessary in PNG’s trade policy. 
Trade policies that favour these strategies 
will induce productivity and innovation. The 
manufacturing sector is recognised as ‘the most 
important, though not the only, route to prosperity’ 
(Chang 2007:201). One way to protect PNG’s economic 
sovereignty and diversify the economy beyond its 
commodity-driven status is to invest in downstream 
processing, more specifically, manufacturing. Whilst 
StaRS has committed PNG to ‘green innovation’ 
(GoPNG 2014:45), the intended beneficiary of green 
innovation is PNG’s nascent manufacturing sector. 
Conclusion
This paper provides an examination of Vision 2050, 
the PNGDSP and claims that they advance the ideas 
contained in the NGDPs. Because the trend has been 
to ascribe the conformity of development blueprints 
to the NGDPs, it is usually taken at face value that 
these blueprints are consistent with the aims of the 
NGDPs. But as this paper reveals, a careful reading of the 
strategies in these developmental plans shows that they do 
not necessarily correlate with the ideals of the NGDPs. 
Vision 2050 and the PNGDSP are not original 
in the development paradigm they espouse. Both 
national policy documents simply iterate commonplace 
development thinking —even from policies initiated 
through the various phases of structural adjustment 
programs since the 1990s. Global competitiveness is the 
motivation and inspiration for the creation of Vision 
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Annexure 1: National Goals and Directive 
Principles – Extract of the Preamble to the 
Constitution of the Independent State of Papua 
New Guinea
WE HEREBY PROCLAIM the following aims as our 
National Goals, and direct allpersons and bodies, 
corporate and unincorporate, to be guided by these our 
declared Directives in pursuing and achieving our aims:
1. Integral human development.
We declare our first goal to be for every person to 
be dynamically involved in the process of freeing 
himself or herself from every form of domination 
or oppression so that each man or woman will have 
the opportunity to develop as a whole person in 
relationship with others
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR–
(1) everyone to be involved in our endeavours to achieve 
integral human development of the whole person for 
every person and to seek fulfilment through his or 
her contribution to the common good; and
(2) education to be based on mutual respect and 
dialogue, and to promote awareness of our human 
potential and motivation to achieve our National 
Goals through self-reliant effort; and
(3) all forms of beneficial creativity, including sciences 
and cultures, to be actively encouraged; and
(4) improvement in the level of nutrition and the 
standard of public health to enable our people to 
attain self fulfilment; and
(5) the family unit to be recognized as the fundamental 
basis of our society, and for every step to be taken 
to promote the moral, cultural, economic and social 
standing of the Melanesian family; and
(6) development to take place primarily through the 
use of Papua New Guinean forms of social and 
political organization.
2. Equality and participation
We declare our second goal to be for all citizens to 
have an equal opportunity to participate in, and 
benefit from, the development of our country.
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR–
(1) an equal opportunity for every citizen to take part 
in the political, economic, social, religious and 
cultural life of the country; and Constitution of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea Preamble
 (2) the creation of political structures that will enable 
effective, meaningful articipation by our people in 
that life, and in view of the rich cultural and ethnic 
diversity of our people for those structures to provide 
for substantial decentralization of all forms of 
government activity; and
(3) every effort to be made to achieve an equitable 
distribution of incomes and other benefits of 
development among individuals and throughout the 
various parts of the country; and
(4) equalization of services in all parts of the country, 
and for every citizen to have equal access to legal 
processes and all services, governmental and 
otherwise, that are required for the fulfilment of his 
or her real needs and aspirations; and
(5) equal participation by women citizens in all political, 
economic, social and religious activities; and
(6) the maximization of the number of citizens 
participating in every aspect of development; and
(7) active steps to be taken to facilitate the organization 
and legal recognition of all groups engaging in 
development activities; and
(8) means to be provided to ensure that any citizen 
can exercise his personal creativity and enterprise 
in pursuit of fulfilment that is consistent with the 
common good, and for no citizen to be deprived 
of this opportunity because of the predominant 
position of another; and
(9) every citizen to be able to participate, either directly 
or through a representative, in the consideration of 
any matter affecting his interests or the interests of 
his community; and
(10) all persons and governmental bodies of Papua New 
Guinea to ensure that, as far as possible, political 
and official bodies are so composed as to be broadly 
representative of citizens from the various areas of 
the country; and
(11) all persons and governmental bodies to endeavour 
to achieve universal literacy in Pisin, Hiri Motu or 
English, and in “tok ples” or “ita eda tano gado”; and
(12) recognition of the principles that a complete 
relationship in marriage rests on equality of rights 
and duties of the partners, and that responsible 
parenthood is based on that equality.
3. National sovereignty and self-reliance
We declare our third goal to be for Papua New Guinea 
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WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR–
(1) wise use to be made of our natural resources and the 
environment in and on the land or seabed, in the sea, 
under the land, and in the air, in the interests of our 
development and in trust for future generations; and
(2) the conservation and replenishment, for the benefit 
of ourselves and posterity, of the environment and 
its sacred, scenic, and historical qualities; and
(3) all necessary steps to be taken to give adequate 
protection to our valued birds, animals, fish, insects, 
plants and trees.
5. Papua New Guinean ways 
We declare our fifth goal to be to achieve 
development primarily through the use of Papua 
New Guinean forms of social, political and economic 
organization.
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR–
(1) a fundamental re-orientation of our attitudes 
and the institutions of government, commerce, 
education and religion towards Papua New 
Guinean forms of participation, consultation, 
and consensus, and a continuous renewal of the 
responsiveness of these institutions to the needs 
and attitudes of the People; and
(2) particular emphasis in our economic development 
to be placed on smallscale artisan, service 
and business activity; and Constitution of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea Preamble
 (3) recognition that the cultural, commercial and 
ethnic diversity of our people is a positive 
strength, and for the fostering of a respect for, 
and appreciation of, traditional ways of life and 
culture, including language, in all their richness and 
variety, as well as for a willingness to apply these 
ways dynamically and creatively for the tasks of 
development; and
(4) traditional villages and communities to remain as 
viable units of Papua New Guinean society, and for 
active steps to be taken to improve their cultural, 
social, economic and ethical quality.
to be politically and economically independent, and 
our economy basically self-reliant.
WE ACCORDINGLY CALL FOR–
(1) our leaders to be committed to these National Goals 
and Directive Principles, to ensure that their freedom 
to make decisions is not restricted by obligations to 
or relationship with others, and to make all of their 
decisions in the national interest; and
(2) all governmental bodies to base their planning for 
political, economic and social development on these 
Goals and Principles; and
(3) internal interdependence and solidarity among 
citizens, and between provinces, to be actively 
promoted; and Preamble Constitution of the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea
(4) citizens and governmental bodies to have control of 
the bulk of economic enterprise and production; and
(5) strict control of foreign investment capital and 
wise assessment of foreign ideas and values so that 
these will be subordinate to the goal of national 
sovereignty and self-reliance, and in particular for 
the entry of foreign capital to be geared to internal 
social and economic policies and to the integrity of 
the Nation and the People; and
(6) the State to take effective measures to control and 
actively participate in the national economy, and in 
particular to control major enterprises engaged in 
the exploitation of natural resources; and
(7) economic development to take place primarily 
by the use of skills and resources available in the 
country either from citizens or the State and not in 
dependence on imported skills and resources; and
(8) the constant recognition of our sovereignty, which 
must not be undermined by dependence on foreign 
assistance of any sort, and in particular for no 
investment, military or foreign-aid agreement or 
understanding to be entered into that imperils our 
self-reliance and selfrespect, or our commitment to 
these National Goals and Directive Principles, or 
that may lead to substantial dependence upon or 
influence by any country, investor, lender or donor.
4. Natural resources and environment
We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New 
Guinea’s natural resources and environment to be 
conserved and used for the collective benefit of us all, 
and be replenished for the benefit of future generations.
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